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Video Nasty 
The Moral Apocalypse in Koji Suzuki’s  Ring  
Dr Steve Jones  
The boom in Japanese horror’s international popularity is widely recognized  
as beginning with Ringu (1998, Japan) (McRoy 91; Harper 7 and 113), the 
influence of which continues to resonate in remakes of J-horror successes.1 
Ring’s popularity is testified to by its numerous spin-offs, sequels, and adap-
tations.2 Despite being at the core of this explosion, the underlying origin 
point—Koji Suzuki’s novel Ring (1991)—has received virtually no scholarly 
attention. The basic story is retained across the novel and its adaptations. 
At its center is a journalist investigating a cursed video, which is rumored to 
cause its viewer to die mysteriously exactly seven days after watching it.  On 
seeing the video, the journalist enlists a familiar acquaintance to help 
uncover the tape’s origins. They unearth the history of Sadako, a psychic girl  
who was thrown into a well to die. The reporter exposes Sadako’s murder 
and believes discovering her body has lifted the video-curse. When their 
acquaintance dies, the journalist realizes that the only means of stopping 
the curse is to copy the videotape and show it to someone else, thus propa-
gating its effects. 
Those consistencies are coupled with some notable differences between 
  
Suzuki’s novel and its filmic adaptations. The female-male investigative duo 
found in each film version of Ring was originally envisaged by Suzuki as a 
male pair composed of a journalist, Asakawa, and his closest friend, Ryuji,  
who asserts that he is a rapist. Although doubt is cast over his proclamation  
in the novel’s closing stages, Ryuji’s declaration shapes his relationship with  
Asakawa, meaning their bond is tense from the outset. Furthermore, Sadako’s  
sexuality is emphasized in the novel, not least since she may have been 
raped by her doctor (Nagao) before being murdered. Moreover, Sadako’s 
body is subject to sexual scrutiny since s=he is revealed to be hermaphroditic 
in the novel. 
However, other striking differences arise from the social themes that drive 
Suzuki’s novel. The film versions blame the video and Sadako’s malevolence 
for the deaths that occur. On the surface, it appears that Suzuki’s novel is 
also focused on Sadako as the curse’s cause since lead protagonist Asakawa 
spends the majority of the novel investigating the video’s origins and 
Sadako’s history, seeking to discover whether the curse is biological or 
supernatural. His failure to find a solution indicates that this is not the novel’s 
point. Suzuki’s novel is concerned with a figurative social critique. The 
novel’s central conceit is a moral dilemma. After watching the cursed video,  
one has to copy the tape and show it to someone else, condemning him or 
her in order to save oneself. The curse itself is not as terrifying as its antidote:  
Asakawa’s willingness to spread the curse regardless of the potential 
consequences. 
Asakawa envisages his decision to condemn others as leading to a literal  
apocalypse. He realizes that he ‘‘can save mankind’’ (366) by sacrificing his  
family, but chooses instead to ‘‘let loose on the world a plague wh ich could 
  
 
destroy all mankind’’ (365). Although more deaths will ensue as a result of his  
actions, Asakawa over-compensates in fretting that he will trigger the end of 
the world. Asakawa’s guilt suggests that he cannot evade feeling morally 
responsible for intentionally dooming others. Yet this fee l ing  of personal 
responsibility is vital since it reveals the curse’s symbolic function. Moving 
between objective narration and subjective view-points, from the minutiae 
of viral infection to the ‘‘apocalyptic’’ future consequences, the narrative 
dramatizes the cost of engaging in systemic violence from a personalized 
perspective. Asakawa is an allegorical conduit, a figure through which Suzuki  
can explore the limits of moral obligation and intersubjectivity.  
R ing  is therefore a parable of social responsibility. Sadako’s curse may be a 
catalyst, but the novel’s true targets are the forms of social sickness— rape, 
murder, self-interest—that privilege the self at the Other’s expense. Such 
behaviors, the narrative proposes, must be transformed or eradicated 
because they are causes of social instability. Suzuki’s novel exposes the 
duties and potential frailties that underpin interdependency.  Ring’s populace 
is dysfunctional precisely because its members lack moral obligation to one 
another. The novel’s allegory points towards the inevitability of a transition 
from egoism to intersubjectivity. Asakawa’s fear of apocalypse represents 
the impact this evolution would have on the self from the perspective of an 
egoistic self threatened by that change. The apocalypse motif illustrates the 
gravity of moral obligation in forming the self. Suzuki dramatizes the 
pressures of moral obligation and the inexorable transition into full selfhood 
via his protagonists. 
In this sense, Ring’s apocalyptic overtones require dissection. Some critics 
have characterized Japanese horror of the last twenty years as being bleak or 
  
nihilistic, particularly because it frequently utilizes apocalyptic imagery (see, 
for instance, Napier 338 and Berriman 75). However, the use of the term 
‘‘apocalyptic’’ is problematic in this context. Christopher Sharrett, for 
example, has expressed a concern over the ‘‘popular misuse of apocalypse 
not as revelation but doomsday, disaster, the end’’ (4). Apocalypse correctly 
signifies a zero-leveling born out of an unsatisfactory or unstable present. 
This transformation need not be negative since the apocalypse-fantasy 
con-notes the opportunity to rebuild society, to make it better.  Ring’s 
populace is constituted by profoundly self-interested individuals whose 
attitudes are closer to solipsism than intersubjectivity. Ring’s apocalypse 
warns that this state is unsustainable because it damages the self. What is at 
stake in Asakawa’s choice is total destruction, or at least this is how he 
perceives it. To the reader, the solution is clear. If no one copied the tape, 
there would be no further harm. The novel thus implies that 
interdependency is a solution to the malevolence haunting the diegetic 
public. Sadako is not the real threat: it is self-interest that plagues Ring’s 
populace. 
In order to explore these themes and Suzuki’s allegorical mode, this article 
will employ Levinas’s ethical philosophy as a point of comparison. The 
comparison highlights what precisely Suzuki’s novel contributes to the 
philosophy of moral obligation by using the novel form and the apocalypse 
motif. 
 
  
 
Moral Obligation, Intersubjectivity, Levinas 
Philosophy has a long history of accounting for how moral codes arise, and 
the relationships between morality and ‘‘rightness’’ or ‘‘wrongness.’’ Levinas  
was interested in the former—how morality arises and defines us—more 
than the latter. Principally, Levinas proposed that morality underpins  
self-conception. He contended that moral obligation is a consequence of 
sociality. In fact, for Levinas, self-conception is contingent on moral 
obligation to Others. These emphases on morality, sociality, and obligation 
make Levinas’s philosophy particularly apt in considering Suzuki’s social 
critique.  
For Levinas, morality arises in conjunction with the individual’s development 
into subjectivity. In his view, we develop selfhood only when we become 
aware of an Other; when we recognize that other people exist  and relate to 
the world as we do. We initially experience the world as ours. At this stage, 
we are, as Levinas’s early philosophy phrases it, simply egoistic.  It is only when 
we realize that the world is not ours a l o n e  that we develop into 
subjectivity. Two implications follow: first, we come to realize that our 
experience is preceded by and will be succeeded by the existence of other 
people. It is this sense of a l l  other people, literally present before us or 
otherwise, that is connoted in capitalizing ‘‘Other.’’ Second, we develop into an 
‘‘I’’ that is differentiated from the Other (‘‘not-I’’). Identity is therefore 
contingent on the Other since we require a ‘‘not-I’’ in order to distinguish the 
‘‘I.’’3 In that sense, we are defined as social entities since we can only define 
identity under the conditions of sociality. Subjectivity is always-already 
intersubjectivity. Both implications conjoin on the point that we are not 
sovereign entities. Egoistic experience of the world is a mistake that is 
  
corrected by the Other’s presence. Moreover, because self is contingent on 
the Other who experiences the world as ‘‘I’’ do and lays at least equal claim 
to the world, each person is morally obliged to the Other. In fact, because 
Others are a priori and a posteriori, the self is always secondary to the Other. 
Ethics is synonymous with this ‘‘responsibility-of-one-person-for-the-other’’ 
(Levinas, Outside 42) since subjectivity is contingent on the subject accepting 
obligations that they did not create. 
Levinas is so pertinent in the context of this article because Suzuki’s social 
critique draws out similar obligations to the Other, testing them via a series 
of tensions. First, Ring establishes that intersubjectivity is simultaneously 
necessary and fragile. For example, Asakawa needs Ryuji’s help to lift the 
curse, yet Asakawa is also willing to sacrifice Ryuji in order to survive. The 
characters have to choose whether their short-term, immediate interests in 
self-preservation and their loved ones’ survival take precedence over their 
moral obligation to Others. This is, as Varga posits, ‘‘one of the most 
fundamental problems in morality: Why be moral, if being moral is not the 
best sort of life for me?’’ (76; see also Pauley 97 and Batson et al. 1190). The 
answer, for Levinas, is that ethics begins with the Other, a priori ‘‘I.’’ Since 
Levinas was more interested in ethics relative to experience than in the 
practical application of morals, he skims over the emotive impact obligation 
has on the self. In contrast, that emotive impact is central to  Ring. 
Suzuki and Levinas share the view that moral obligation is a fundamental 
source of pressure. They also concur that human experience plays a crucial 
role in uncovering those tensions. Yet Suzuki and Levinas diverge in their 
approaches. Levinas’s project in explaining the relationships between 
here-and-now experience and ethics is to debunk ontology. Levinas’s com -
  
 
mitment to self-Other relations means the ‘‘I’’ is properly conceived of as an 
‘‘I-Thou of dialogue’’ with the Other, not an ‘‘I-it,’’ an object in the world 
(Outside 35). Levinas’s self is phenomenological; that is, he is focused on 
consciousness. Suzuki, on the other hand, uses protagonists’ experiences to 
critique social relations. 
Ring’s critique of social dysfunction employs the self=Other separation at key 
points to question the nature of social interaction and moral obligation. In 
the novel’s climax, and having failed to find a cure for the video -curse, Ryuji 
expires. At this moment, it revealed why the video’s victims die of pure 
fright. As he looks at himself, he sees that ‘‘[t]he face in the mirror was none 
other than his own, a hundred years in the future. Even Ryuji hadn’t known it 
would be so terrifying to meet himself transformed into someone else’’ (344). 
The exteriorization and transformation of the self into an Other is clearly 
designated as the ultimate unimaginable horror. In this instance, it is clear 
that Suzuki shares Levinas’s conception of the ‘‘I’’ being  defined by its 
difference from ‘‘not-I.’’ When Ryuji cannot orient himself as  ‘‘I,’’ he 
perceives himself as Other. That move leads to his eradication. He  dies of 
fright because his self-conception crumbles. 
This horror is rooted in the video-curse that claims Ryuji’s life. Ryuji dies 
because he saw the video but failed to copy it and show it to someone else.  
The curse’s ‘‘rules’’ literalize moral obligation as a dilemma. The self  can 
survive only by choosing to vanquish the Other. In Ryuji’s case, because the 
instructions had been removed from the copy he was exposed to, he did 
not know how to resolve the curse. His death is nevertheless haunted by 
the interconnection of self and Other in the imagery Suzuki employs. 
Following Ryuji’s death, Asakawa realizes what must be done to save himself.  
  
His revelation is equally imbued with the ethos that ‘‘the encounter with the  
Other is my responsibility for him . . . taking upon oneself the fate of the 
other’’ (Levinas, Entre 88). Asakawa perceives his choice to condemn an= 
Other as the apocalypse.4 In parallel to the implication of Otherness in Ryuji’s  
death, Asakawa envisages his decision to self-preserve as the destruction of 
everything .  The Other’s survival is pivotal to existence.  
This is where Suzuki’s character-led drama explores moral obligation in a 
manner Levinas does not. Asakawa’s emotive response plays out what 
Levinas only hypothesizes when he states that ‘‘if there were no orde r of 
justice, there would be no limit to my responsibility’’  (Entre 90). Although 
everyone has the right to defend their own life and may be emotionally 
drawn to prioritize their loved ones’ welfare over others’, to do so is morally  
problematic since it involves intentionally condemning others to death. 5 
Despite being understandable, Asakawa apprehends that his choice to dis -
tribute the tape in order to preserve himself and his immediate loved ones 
is morally unjustifiable. The imbalance between saving his family and con-
demning humankind is overwhelming for Asakawa. That disproportion is 
reflected in the apocalypse that he perceives as resulting from his decision.  
The apocalypse Asakawa envisions is thus not the erasure of the Other that  
would divest him of obligation. Rather, destroying the Other also means 
eradicating the self. His decision to condemn another dooms him, too, since  
he is always-already someone else’s Other. Suzuki’s apocalypse is thus sys-
temic in nature, calling into question the relationship and balance between 
self and Other. 
The apocalypse is not a purely destructive in the novel, however. Suzuki  uses 
apocalyptic threat to productively question social relations, pointing 
  
 
towards the possibility of something more. Since the apocalypse is rooted 
in conflict between self and Other—the negation of responsibility for the 
Other—it could be resolved by embracing full, ethical obligation to the 
Other. It is not the apocalypse but rather the protagonists’ flawed attitudes 
towards moral obligation that threaten to destroy the world. As Suzuki 
demonstrates, it is not only Asakawa who exhibits this flaw. His attitude is 
representative, resonating in all of  Ring’s social interactions. Understanding 
Suzuki’s social critique allows us to further grasp  Ring’s value as a 
philosophical project. 
 
The Horror of  Social Commitment  
Rin g ’s social critique is founded on its allegorical protagonist. Asakawa’s per -
spective dominates the novel, yet his morally flawed choices are indicative of  
much broader problems, all of which are implicated as contributing to the 
potential ‘‘apocalypse.’’ While Levinas dismisses the possibility of solipsistic  
human existence since subjectivity is contingent on sociality, Suzuki portrays a 
society constituted by emotionally divorced individuals. Despite their evi -
dently differing approaches, Suzuki shares Levinas’s apprehension that this 
situation is untenable. Suzuki’s portrayal of social alienation illustrates the 
horrifying consequences of people negating their obligation to one another.  
The video-curse relies on the individual forsaking Others in favor of his or her 
personal well-being. Rather than causing people to become asocial, however, 
this curse arises out of, and therefore is indicative of, social flaws that 
pre-exist the video. To that end, the novel revels in its populace’s 
  
self-interested attitudes since they provide much of the text’s horror. 
Incidental characters such as Kimura, who only makes a brief appearance in 
the opening, are present to demonstrate that self-interestedness is pervas-
ive. When a motorcyclist collapses onto Kimura’s taxi, Kimura is initially only  
concerned about the scratch on his vehicle, not the rider’s spasms (12). 
Presenting such flagrant disregard for another’s suffering so early in the novel  
establishes that self-interest is a diegetic social norm. 
At its most extreme points, the novel presents interaction as outright dis -
connection. This is most profoundly manifested in Suzuki’s sexual imagery. 
For example, the instance of two teen victims ‘‘getting ready to do it’’ (41) is 
reversed by the curse. They are found ‘‘pressed up against the doors, as if 
they were trying to get as far away from each other as they could’’ (42). Their 
assignation—which should signal their intimate connection—becomes a 
moment of terrifying separation. Elsewhere, the violence of such a reversal  is 
explicitly connected to the looming apocalypse. Ryuji conceives of Sadako’s 
curse as a kind of anti-birth. He realizes that Sadako ‘‘wanted to have a 
child,’’ but because her hermaphroditic ‘‘body couldn’t bear one,’’ the 
victims of her curse become her ‘‘children’’ instead (343). The curse is 
characterized as a form of auto-propagation that detracts from rather than 
ensures the populace’s growth. Ryuji’s own misanthropic ‘‘dreams for the 
future’’ further connect the looming apocalypse with sexualized asociality: 
‘‘[w]hile viewing the extinction of the human race from the top of a hill, I 
would dig a hole in the earth and ejaculate into it over and over’’ (117). 
Ryuji’s sexual revelry—which clearly connotes ‘‘fuck the Earth’’—is markedly 
solitary. These powerful sexual images have a significant impact on  Ring’s 
tone. They are spread across the novel, meaning comparisons are regularly 
  
 
drawn between social disconnection and the apocalyptic violence it signals.  
Given his apocalypse-masturbation fantasy, it is unsurprising that Ryuji is the 
novel’s misanthropic mouthpiece, concretizing the populace’s pervas ive 
problems. His attitude is summated in his declaration that ‘‘all those idiots  
who prattle on about world peace and the survival of humanity make me 
puke’’ (117). This sentiment—which marks him as ‘‘highly individualistic’’ (1 
19)—leads Asakawa to underestimate their social bond: ‘‘[h]e suddenly felt  
himself wondering, like he always did, just why he was friends with this guy’’ 
(121). Asakawa then uses that position to justify showing Ryuji the tape, 
rationalizing, ‘‘[w]hat do I care if Ryuji ends up dead? Someone who says he  
wants to watch the extinction of mankind doesn’t deserve to live a long life’’  
(122–23). Although deeply unsound, Asakawa and Ryuji’s friendship is the 
strongest social bond that the novel offers. Despite Asakawa’s apparent 
devotion to his family—for whom he would risk humanity’s future whom— 
he cannot relate to them. He instead defers to an outsider, characterizing 
Ryuji as ‘‘the outlet for all the emotions he couldn’t breakdown and show his 
wife’’ (185). It is only after Ryuji is dead that Asakawa comprehends that  his 
friend gave up everything to help him (356). Asakawa’s relationships indicate 
that even the most pivotal points of interconnection—family and friends—do 
not provide the social connectivity they ought to here. Indeed, they are 
ultimately associated with destruction. 
Despite Asakawa’s flawed relationships, his worldview is far less overtly 
asocial than Ryuji’s. However, it is just as terrifying. Early in the novel, 
Asakawa reflects that it ‘‘felt like it had been a long time since he’d seen 
another human being, and something within him wanted to talk’’ (78). After 
watching the video, his instincts are immediately social in intent; ‘‘peering 
  
around the room in every direction. . . he didn’t realize that he was trying to 
look pathetic, to draw sympathy,’’ even though he was alone (109). His 
desire for social contact highlights the interdependence on which subjectivity 
is founded. However, his social experiences contrast with that desire. For 
example, when Asakawa’s daughter throws a tantrum in public, it is stated 
that ‘‘the accusing stares of the other passengers always made [Asakawa] feel 
like he was choking’’ (53). This insight demonstrates the horrific pressure 
sociality represents within the novel. Even minor social infringements such as 
failing to control one’s child are hyperbolized, becoming life-threatening. That 
same terror is later augmented via one of the cursed videotape’s images,  
which portrays ‘‘a hundred human faces. Each one displayed hatred and 
animosity .... All that criticism, directed right at him’’ (102–3). This amplifi-
cation eventually escalates into Asakawa’s certainty that apocalypse looms. 
Characterized in this way, obligation is a pressure that becomes increasingly  
horrific as the novel progresses. 
 
Fetish and Dis -Connection  
Asakawa’s feeling of distance in intimacy recurs in various guises throughout  
Ring.  In the novel’s earliest stages, the city environment is described as an  
isolating space: ‘‘[n]early a hundred dwellings were crammed into each build-
ing, but most of the inhabitants had never even seen the faces of their neigh -
bors. The only proof that people lived here came at night, when windows lit  
up’’ (3). Despite depicting a confluence of individuals, the city’s residents are 
divorced from one another. Their presence is evidenced only by the lights 
that speak of their existence, but which are also profoundly anonymizing. 
  
 
Moreover, Asakawa’s desire for companionship in this asocial sphere is  ech-
oed in the guest-book he reads. As he observes, ‘‘when couples stayed. . . 
their entries showed it, while when single people stayed, they wrote about 
how much they wanted a companion’’ (90). Like the cityscape  lights, these 
entries are little more than markers of presence that forge an impression of 
and desire for connectivity between the scribe and the guest -book’s 
reader. Yet those markers most aptly highlight the distance between the 
two parties. 
These examples raise two important points. First, Asakawa’s feelings of 
isolation are representative rather than unique. That is, he is not alone in 
feeling alone. The second point impacts the former. Both the cityscape lights  
and the guest book are fetishistic, standing in for personal interaction and 
exacerbating the distanced feeling that characterizes sociality here. More 
importantly, that fetishism is paralleled in the novel’s pivotal moral dilemma.  
Distributing the cursed video involves distance between participants 
inasmuch as one may issue the video without meeting the victim thereby 
condemned. The video is thus a fetishistic object. Rather than being a direct  
interaction between two people—the distributor and the receiver of the 
tape—the video acts as a bridge. Those two parties only directly interact with 
the tape, not with each other. 
It may appear that this distance would ease the moral burden for the 
person disseminating the tape, since it permits the victim to remain 
faceless. As Chen et al. observe, ‘‘exchanges with distant others (e.g., a 
stranger) are likely to provoke a ‘transactional’ mindset that focuses on 
exchanges of immediate and tangible benefits and costs’’ (25). Condemning 
one’s loved ones (or oneself) instinctually seems like the most ‘‘immediate 
  
and tangible’’ cost that can be avoided by copying the tape. However, as 
Asakawa’s torment reveals, the tape-copier cannot escape the knowledge 
that the process will cause another’s death. Obligation to the distant Other, 
the novel proposes, is too great to evade. 
The video thus fails as a separating object, as is corroborated by descriptions 
of the video, which intertwine engaging with the video and bodily 
incursion. The protagonists theorize that the ‘‘video hadn’t been recorded 
by a machine. A human being’s eyes, ears, nose, tongue, skin—all five senses 
had been used to make this video’’ (190). Watching the video is also charac-
terized as an immersive experience, presenting the viewer with an ‘‘incred -
ible sense of immediacy, as if you are actually a participating in the scene’’ 
(189). It is said to stimulate the viewer’s ‘‘senses. . . sounds and visions 
appeared as if [the viewer were] suddenly recalling them’’ (104). Accordingly,  
Asakawa ‘‘couldn’t shake the feeling that something had climbed into his 
body’’ after watching the video (190). The seamless blending of exterior 
description with interior monologue here attests to the connectivity necessi -
tated by the video-curse. Since making and watching the video are perceived 
as being somehow corporeal, the individual who copies the tape cannot 
for-get the Other thus condemned. The video itself refuses to let participants 
think of distribution as anything other than an intimate social interaction 
because watching the tape is so personally intrusive. Rather than assuaging 
moral guilt by creating a physical distance between the watcher and the 
copier, the video stands in for the moral obligation that exists between these 
two parties, signaling that the tape-distributor has contravened their 
obligations. 
 
  
 
Becoming Intersubjective 
The personal, subjective fear that characters express when watching the tape 
is externalized and reified in the act of copying the tape and willingly killing 
an=other. This is Ring’s central horror, one that echoes Levinas’s vision of 
intersubjectivity. For Levinas, moral obligation is founded on murder prohib-
ition since the ‘‘I’’ is contingent on the Other’s a  p r i o r i  existence (Entre  145). 
Entering into (inter)subjectivity involves a shift in how one engages with the 
world. The egoistic self is consumptive in nature, integrating all it encounters 
into itself, since self is everything to the egoistic ‘‘I.’’ The Other disrupts such  
consumption because the Other cannot be assimilated into the egoistic self 
(Levinas, O t h e r w i s e  102). This disturbance is a kind of world-altering viol-
ence. Suzuki’s description of watching the video is akin to that disruption, 
involving a negation of the watcher’s ‘‘I.’’ Asakawa’s phenomenal experience  
of watching the tape entails perceiving events from Sadako ’s sensorial per-
spective. The self=Other gap is bridged, but at cost to the watcher who is dis-
placed. Ring’s interactions are undergirded by a culmination of such 
anxieties, ultimately suggesting that entering into intersubjectivity is a violent  
upheaval. The apocalypse Asakawa predicts in the novel’s climax is the 
logical conclusion to that disturbance. The novel’s allegory is focused on this  
transition. 
As Levinas has it, the Other’s presence ‘‘breaks the [egoistic] system’’ 
( E n t r e  38). This breakage is aptly apocalyptic, involving a total remapping 
of the world for the subject. From the ego’s  perspective, obligation to the 
Other is the end of the world since it is the end of perceiving the world as 
solely belonging to oneself. This realization is a productive rather than purely  
destructive process. Prior to recognizing the Other’s existence, the egoistic 
  
self is divorced from the world, being defined by its own ‘‘protestation 
against totality’’ (Levinas, Totality 26). The egoistic self exists in an illusory 
state of denial, then. The egoistic self may be abnegated in becoming 
inter-subjective, but this is necessary in order to recreate the ‘‘I’’ as a full 
subject. It is exactly that kind of necessary cataclysm that  Ring depicts.  
Suzuki’s social critique and fetishistic relations portray the populace as clinging 
to solipsistic, egoistic existence that cannot be sustained. Indeed, the novel’s 
fetishistic motifs demonstrate that even apparently and intentionally 
distanced engagements are nevertheless inescapably interactive. The egoistic 
populace cannot resist the apocalypse that is their movement into full 
(inter)subjectivity. 
Thus, Suzuki presents the apocalypse as inexorable. One of the novel’s 
earliest subjective statements—‘‘Tomoko.. . resented the clear sky’’ (5)— 
finds its completion in the final image of ‘‘[b]lack clouds mov[ing] eerily 
across the skies. . . unleashing some apocalyptic evil’’ (367). This bookending  
lends an air of inevitability to the novel’s tale of societal collapse. Sadako’s 
life-story—which causes the curse—is revealed as a history and thus is 
irreversible. The video recording is a fixed echo of Sadako’s past which reso -
nates in the future, meaning the consequences seem unavoidable. Simul -
taneously, a great deal of the novel’s mystery plot is constituted by 
unraveling her life, driving Ring forward towards an apparently unpreventa-
ble cessation. The same is true of Asakawa’s self-assessment prior to even 
watching the video. Looking at his reflection he saw ‘‘the face of a sick man  . . . 
Maybe he’d already  caught the virus’’ (89, emphasis added). The audio 
snippets he then hears on the tape resound with this sense of inescapability, 
taunting ‘‘your health. . . bound to get you’’ (101, ellipsis in the original).  
  
 
Obligation to the Other thus haunts Asakawa throughout the novel. When he 
encounters that pressure, he responds by seeking to preserve his egoistic 
self-world relation. Sadako epitomizes the Other for Asakawa. He 
characterizes Otherness—and the obligation it implies—as a malevolent dis-
ease that threatens to annihilate. What Asakawa seeks to evade, but cannot 
escape, is his world being rebuilt around his obligation to the Other. His 
decision to condemn others is not therefore an outright rejection of obli -
gation, since he cannot avoid what ensues. Although Asakawa can decide to 
copy the video and thus kill others, he cannot choose whether or not he is 
morally obliged to the Other he dooms. Ethics is the groundwork of sociality 
for Suzuki, as it is for Levinas. Ethics pre-exists and is essential to the 
formation of the subject qua subject. Resultantly, Asakawa’s choice to 
condemn the Other is his first step into becoming a subject. His apocalyptic 
vision implies that he understands he is violating the Other’s right to exist. 
His guilt articulates his obligation to the Other. The apocalypse thus signifies 
his transformation into intersubjectivity. 
 
The Purposes of Allegory  
Suzuki encourages the reader to think figuratively about  Ring’s events by 
thwarting his characters’ narrow, inflexible viewpoints. The characters’ 
attempts to understand their situation fail because they look for causal, linear 
meanings rather than broader, macroscopic explanations. Asakawa’s quest to  
find a cure for the video-curse is doomed because he takes the curse too 
literally. From the outset the characters incorrectly refer to the curse as a 
biological virus, yet the epidemiological explanation underlines the broader 
  
meaning: that Ring’s horror is principally social. The curse is presented as a 
zymotic disease. That is, it is a virus that requires a populace in close contact  in 
order to spread (see Karlen 48). The characters offer comparisons between the 
video-curse and infections—such as AIDS (49, 162, 276), bubonic plague (276), 
tuberculosis (284, 255, 270), and smallpox (284, 287, 292)—that spread via 
contact. However, they fail to spot that interaction is the real concern. 
Moreover, diseases, as Nancy Cero Hollander observes, typically result in the 
erosion of community links, and lead citizens to seek ‘‘self -preservation in 
isolation’’ (123). It is this latter issue with which Ring is concerned. It is 
noted in Ring that ‘‘a virus usurps living structures in order to reproduce 
itself’’ (361), but here ‘‘structures’’ connotes societal systems more than indi -
vidual organisms. The curse is a symptom of social dysfunction since it 
requires the will to self-preservation to propagate. The curse is not a disease, 
but rather it signifies social dis-ease. 
To understand Ring as simply as the tale of a vengeful ghost—as Verbinski 
and Nakata do in their adaptations—is to fall into the same trap of being too 
literal. The curse initially seems to belong to a category of violence that is 
‘‘enacted by social agents, evil individuals,’’ but this ‘‘distract[s]  our attention 
from [and consolidates] the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view 
other forms of violence’’ (Zizek 9). In Ring,  the crucial ‘‘other form’’—or Other 
form—is moral responsibility. Asakawa and Ryuji are driven to ‘‘resolve’’ the 
Sadako case out of necessity inasmuch as they will die if they do not. However, 
that pressure is a metaphor for intersubjective obligation. To read Sadako as 
taking vengeance out on the world is to disregard the anti-solipsistic ethos 
that pervades Ring.  
To focus on Asakawa as individual protagonist is also to misconstrue Suzuki’s 
  
 
point. Despite the narrative weight placed on Asakawa—the majority of the 
novel is aligned with his vantage point—Ring is not concerned with his 
experience as an individual. While Asakawa’s role as an investigative reporter  
puts him in a unique position to drive the novel’s mystery story, his personal 
response to the virus is presented as typical. That is, despite Asakawa’s focus  
on individual responsibility—his  desire to solve the mystery or his declaration 
that his  decisions ‘‘can save mankind’’ or otherwise (366)—the problem is that 
‘‘everybody’’ would do the same (364). Asakawa is thus to be interpreted as an  
allegorical figure. The character’s personal choices stand for what anyone 
would do. That is, his choices articulate broader problems regarding each 
individual’s a priori responsibility for the Other. Asakawa is not simply 
justifying his decision by projecting it onto ‘‘everybody.’’ The narrative corro -
borates his assessment via its self-interested populace. Since ‘‘everybody’’ 
would condemn the Other, the entire populace is brought to a universal 
conclusion. An egoistic society must inevitably collapse in on itself.  
The allegorical mode is apt for such an exploration since its universalization 
encapsulates how we each experience the Other. We recognize that others 
claim the same relation to the world that we experience ourselves, even if 
we can never know what it is to be someone else. Engaging with the Other 
requires a kind of empathic projection, an estimation of how we might feel in 
their place. This is inherent to Levinas’s conception of the end lessly negating 
self that is continually directed toward ‘‘something other than  ourselves’’ (On 
Escape 58). Moral universalization, in this view, is rooted in phenomenal 
experience, which requires that we presume all Others have commensurate 
experiences of the world.6 
Suzuki uses Asakawa both as allegorical figure and as a point of emotional 
  
engagement by portraying his subjective states. This mode is  Ring’s central 
strength and Suzuki’s principal contribution to these philosophical 
discussions of selfhood and moral obligation.  Ring’s allegory is unique 
because it dramatizes how the transformation of the egoistic self into 
intersubjectivity feels for the ‘‘I’’ undergoing that change.  Ring shares many of 
Levinas’s philosophical aims, yet Levinas brushes over the initial stage, 
focusing his attention not on the egoistic self but on the intersubjective self 
and its relation to the Other. Levinas is concerned with outward movement, 
away from the self. He concentrates on the Other, on the conditions that 
pre-exist the subject ‘‘before acting, before feelings,’’ perceiving emotion as 
that which ‘‘shuts us up within ourselves’’ (Entre 36, 38). Those emotions 
point away from the self for Levinas. Suzuki utilizes inward, emotional 
experience to explore the violent upheaval of becoming a subject. Ring’s 
horror emphases the flux and how that feels and thus is emotionally engaging 
in a way Levinas’s philosophy cannot be. 
Suzuki’s other significant contribution to these debates stems from the 
relationship between allegory and social critique in  Ring. Suzuki’s novel uses 
allegory to underline that moral obligation is integral to selfhood but uses the  
horror idiom to warn that a populace motivated by self-interest is one that 
teeters on the brink of collapse. That underlying flaw is the ‘‘Devil’’ that Ryu ji 
warns will reappear ‘‘in a different guise’’ as long as humans exist (366, 276).  
The novel’s apocalypse presents this looming disaster as a situation for which  
everyone is personally responsible. 
In conclusion, then, Ring does not write off humanity. It points out the 
dangers of self-interest to underscore how necessary it is to remain conscious 
of our moral obligation to others. The novel’s ending predicts  rather than 
  
 
depicts devastation, meaning that the ‘‘apocalypse’’ is a stage in a process 
of becoming: that is, becoming a full subject.  Ring’s surface tone feels 
fatalistic and the central conceit means the causal path appears to be clearly 
delimited: if one watches video, one dies. However, the novel’s social 
critique is interested in the ‘‘uncertain future’’ (366) of communal relations. 
Asakawa’s uncertainty over the future and Ring’s moral denouement leave 
the reader with a series of questions regarding selfhood, moral responsibility, 
and the internalization of social obligation. The true horror of Suzuki’s story is 
not the ghost or the video: it is ourselves. 
 
Notes 
1. For example, Honogurai mizu no soko kara (2002, Japan) was remade as 
the American film Dark Water (2005, USA), and significantly influenced the 
plot and aesthetic of Fear (2007, India). 
2. These include Koji’s sequel novels (Rasen [1995] and Rupu [1998]), and 
the many film adaptations spawned by the text; the television movie Ringu: 
Kanzen-Ban (1995, Japan), the television series Ringu: Saishusho (1999, Japan), 
the theatrical-release film adaptations Ringu (1998, Japan), Ring Virus (1999, 
Korea), and The Ring (2002, USA), as well as the sequel films Rasen (1998, 
Japan) and the TV series of the same name (Japan, 1999, both of which are 
based on Koji Suzuki’s follow-up novel Spiral), Ringu 2 (1999, Japan, an original 
screenplay based on Ringu), and The Ring Two (2005, USA, another remake), the 
prequel Ringu 0: Basudei (2000,Japan) and Sadako3D (2012,Japan). Its influence 
is also clearly felt in subsequent Japanese horror films dealing with 
  
malevolent spirits that utilize technology as a conduit for contaminating the 
human populace, such as Chakushin Ari (2003, Japan), Gosuto Shisutemu (2002, 
Japan), and End Call (2008, Japan). 
3. Similar views are expressed by Alweiss 428; Datsur 7; Erneling 174; 
McGann and De Jaegher 427; Strawson 405. 
4. Suzuki’s apocalyptic allegory thus matches Levinas’s tendency towards 
excess or dramatic hyperbole (Surber 295). 
5. On this, see Leverick’s thorough dissection of morality and self-defense. 
6. Universalization is to be differentiated from generalization, which for 
Levinas is ‘‘death’’ (Entre 23). 
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